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In this article a  process-tracing approach is used to explore  how different factors have 
contributed to the development of healthcare policy in Bolivia, in light of the current proposal to 
introduce a unified public healthcare system. The main findings are that although international 
relations  and state bureaucrats have  been  crucial to the process of formulating policies, the 
introduction of comprehensive reform will depend on the ability of groups who currently lack 
access to the healthcare system to form progressive coalitions promoting universalism, as well as 
the ability of those who benefit from the current arrangements to maintain the status quo. The 
ability to introduce comprehensive reforms is thus connected to the  ongoing processes  of 
decentralisation  and democratisation of political decision-making in Bolivia. Although state-
corporative welfare state institutions have been shown to be difficult to transform, low coverage 
levels in such systems combined with a process of increasing political inclusion of previously 
marginalised groups poses serious challenges to the status quo as the social aspect of citizenship 
is brought up on the agenda. In order to achieve universal coverage of the healthcare system, 
however, basic social rights of all citizens must be institutionalised at the same time as the scope 
and quality of services must be secured in order to avoid segmentation and to encourage the 
financial participation of the formal and middle income sectors. 
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1. Introduction 
Latin America pioneered the development of social security, with the first countries introducing 
social health insurance during the 1910s and 1920s. Although social security has spread across 
the continent, the programs only cover an estimate of 45 percent of the population, leaving 
informal workers and the great majority of the rural population excluded from access.
 1
  The interest of this thesis is to investigate what has brought the Bolivian 
government to the brink of enacting a reform, making health care a claim-right towards the 
government. In order to do this, this article offers an account of the historical evolution of the 
right to health care in Bolivia and seeks to connect the evolution of new institutions to socio-
political factors promoting or precluding change. The purpose of this exercise is to contribute 
to the knowledge about the processes shaping social policy by relating the Bolivian case to the 
growing literature on welfare state development and institutional change. By doing so the case 
study of Bolivian healthcare reform serves to illuminate the benefits and setbacks of theoretical 
explanations about welfare state development which have been recurrent in social science 
research. It also contributes to our understanding how welfare state institutions develop in a 
context characterised by labour market informality and segmented social policy, common 
features of the context in many developing countries where social policy institutions are being 
reformed. 
 The 
Bolivian health care system presents some of the general features of social policy in the region, 
including a dual labour market, segmented and regressive social policies and staggering levels of 
inequality. The  healthcare system retains these features and has been unable to tackle the 
precarious health situation of the population, despite incremental reforms introduced during the 
last decades. The country shows one of the highest levels of informality in the labour market in 
the continent, and access to health care remains highly dependent on ability to pay for services. 
Confronted with this situation the Bolivian government has launched a proposal for a 
comprehensive reform of the health care system, envisioning  universal access to a unified 
system by expanding the public sector. This case is used to asses some of the recurrent claims in 
welfare state research on how welfare state institutions emerge and evolve over time, in order to 
improve our understanding of how social citizenship rights become institutionalised. 
 
The main question seeking its answer throughout this thesis is accordingly: 
 
                                                 
1 Mesa-Lago (2009) p. vi.   5 
Which are the driving forces behind the universalisation of the healthcare system in Bolivia? 
 
The thesis begins by introducing the Latin American social policy context and highlighting 
some of the most important concepts which impinge on our understanding of healthcare 
reform in Bolivia and Latin America. In the following chapter, the theoretical framework of the 
study is introduced, by presenting theories derived from research on welfare states, institutional 
change and policy diffusion. The review of the theoretical literature includes a number of 
hypotheses to be assessed throughout the case study. This chapter is then rounded of by a 
discussion of some of the previous research on healthcare and social policy reform in relation to 
the approach for this study. In the third chapter, the methodological considerations made when 
designing the study are discussed, introducing the study’s approach to historical explanation. 
After this the case study is presented,  were  the theoretical frameworks discussed earlier is 
applied to data on the evolution and contemporary reform of the Bolivian healthcare system in 
light of a changing political and socio-economic context. The thesis is then rounded of with a 
discussion around the most important findings from the case study and their implications for 
our understanding of how welfare state institutions evolve over time. 
 
2 Social policy in Latin America: Universalism, targeting and 
social insurance  
In contrast to many other developing regions Latin America has a long history of formal 
welfare institutions. The development of modern social security institutions accelerated from 
the 1920’s and onwards, evolving in a variety of ways reflecting general patterns of stratification 
in each society.
2 The main strategy for achieving universal social protection in Latin America 
during the mid twentieth century has been through state-corporatist institutions, with social 
insurance granting defined benefits to workers in the formal sector. In reality, these systems 
created a “stratified universalism”, mainly protecting population groups linked to the state-
building and industrialisation projects, while institutionalising patterns of exclusion and giving 
the welfare systems a regressive character.
3
  Severe economic crisis and subsequent structural adjustments during the last two 
decades of the twentieth century, the latter encompassing trade liberalisation, macro-economic 
stabilisation and privatisation together with labour and capital market liberalisation turned the 
  
                                                 
2 Mesa-Lago (1978) p. 5, 17ff. 
3 Mkandawire (2005) p. 4.   6 
Latin American economies  away from income substitution industrialisation towards export 
oriented growth strategies. With the decline of industrialisation and a process of 
democratisation which did not yield sufficient reductions in the level of poverty, new forms of 
social protection emerged. With international financial institutions such as the IMF framing 
welfare programs as distortionist, many of these institutions were reformed, giving them an 
increasingly residual character.
4  The difficult extension of social insurance, the stratified 
character of social services and the high levels of poverty combined with a decline of organised 
labour as promoters of reform has led to a focus on targeted social assistance.
5 In the healthcare 
sector the reforms in the region have resulted in an expansion of private insurance and care 
provision, with greater autonomy for private providers and more elements of competition, with 
private and social insurance gaining ground from the public sub-system.
6
  With the implementation of new social policies in developing countries during the 
last two decades, there has been a lively debate on the design of social programs.
 
7 A targeted 
approach to social protection, promoted by many IFIs, have been claimed to generate higher 
levels of redistribution by making effective use of public resources and by channelling these to 
those in greatest need of assistance.
8 However, universalistic policies have in turn been noticed 
to generate even higher levels of overall redistribution due to their cross-class characteristics, 
making higher revenues available for redistribution.
9 Recent trends on a global level point 
towards a drift away from a strict application of targeting towards more universal programs,
10 
but often retaining a focus on the poorest segments of the population.
11
  However, this renewed interest for universalist policies also highlights the 
different meanings that have been assigned to the word.
 
12 The main source of confusion 
emerges from the use of the word to describe the aim, effects as well as the characteristics of 
social policy. Here, universalism will be referred to as the institutional characteristics of specific 
social policy programs with universal access to a comprehensive set of services, irrespective of 
labour market status or ability to pay.
13
   The Bolivian proposition for a Unified Health System (SUS)  embraces this 
comprehensive understanding of universalism and proposes a reform which attempts to break 
 
                                                 
4 Barrientos (2004) p. 141. 
5 Barrientos (2010) p. 10. 
6 Barrientos (2004) p. 142ff, See also Weyland (2006). 
7 See Mkandawire (2005), Barros & Carvalho (2004). 
8 Barros & Carvalho (2004). 
9 Korpi & Palme (1998), Mkadawire (2005) p. 13. 
10 Deacon (2005). 
11 Filgueira et al (2006). 
12 See Bergh (2004). 
13 Cf. Rothstein (2001) p. 218.   7 
with the segmented character of the healthcare system.
14
   The Unified Health System thus signifies a break with the previously segmented 
national health system where a social insurance, public, private and traditional medicine sub 
systems each provided healthcare to separate population groups depending on labour market 
status and ability to pay, with scarce coordination between them. The new system envisions 
universal accesses and emphasises public provision and funding from general taxation, collected 
at different levels, in contrast to the previous domination by social insurance and out-of-pocket 
payments as primary funding mechanism.
 The proposition suggests that the 
public health care system on all levels, together with the providers of traditional medicine is to 
constitute the Unified Healthcare System. The existing social health insurance funds are to be 
incorporated into the system through special agreements. All funds which are currently being 
directed to health care within the public system at all levels, including departmental and 
municipal funds, are to be collected in a national Unified Health Fund destined to finance the 
new health care system. The government is then to allocate additional resources to this fund in 
order to guarantee a budget of 70 USD per person not insured by the mandatory  social 
insurance system. These resources are then to be distributed to specific departmental, municipal 
and indigenous community health accounts, according to population size, level of poverty, 
geographical coverage levels and the level of provision. The proposition recognises the same 
organisational levels as the current healthcare system; local, municipal, departmental and 
national, while introducing the indigenous communities as an additional level. The access to the 
SUS is to be universal, abolishing out-of-pocket payments, and will thus replace the current 
public insurance schemes  covering women in fertile age, children under  five years and the 




 The question under study is thus: how does such a 
change come about? 
3 Theoretical framework 
The following  section presents a framework for analysing social policy change;  taking the 
interplay between actors, institutions and ideas into account, drawing up five hypotheses based 
on the theoretical perspectives presented. 
 
                                                 
14 The proposal for a “Sistema Único de Salud” has been promoted by the Ministry of Health and was recently 
formulated as a proposition to the executive and the congress. See Ministerio de Salud y Deportes (2011a). 
15 For a diagnostic of the Bolivian healthcare system, se for example Picado & Durán (2007) or Prieto & Cid (2010).   8 
3.1 Power resource approach 
Many scholars have emphasised that the way in which institutions are created and function 
reflects the distribution of power in society, with a change in power distribution leading to 
institutional change.
 16 The power resource approach (PRA) offers a way to conceptualise these 
conflicts and thereby linking them to the development and divergence between different welfare 
regimes or institutional models.
17
  PRA conceptualises welfare state institutions in terms of “policies to affect 
outcomes of, and conditions for, distributive processes in the sphere of markets so as to 
decrease inequality and/or poverty”.
 
18 Employment relations are seen as the primary 
mechanism shaping the processes of socio-economic stratification and employers and 
employees are therefore seen as the main antagonists in these conflicts over distribution. The 
important distinction between these two groups lay in the types of assents they employ in 
labour markets, with employers engaging their economic assets while employees primarily rely 
on their labour power. The characteristics of economic assets, making them transferable 
between individuals, tend to concentrate these resources while labour power remain disperse. 
The efficacy of labour power might however be significantly enhance via collective action. 
These characteristics of labour markets creates a logic of the situation were holders of concentrated 
economic assets tend to be more favourable towards market solutions where their assets are 
most efficacious, while employees are more dependent on collective action to enhance the 
efficacy of their resources, thus favouring political and non-market solutions to a greater 
extent.
19
  Thus Navarro states that  the principle of universality has been a paramount 
importance to the working class, assuring the principle of class solidarity, and that working class 
organisations have historically opposed both corporatism and targeting as ways to structure 
healthcare policy.
 
20 However, differences among employees with regards to their positions on 
the labour market might differentiate their positions towards the welfare state institutions.
21
  Bolivia is one of the most unequal countries in the most unequal region of the 
world, with political conflicts arising over the distribution of society’s resources. The PRA thus 
inform us of a possible way of explaining the emergence of a unified healthcare system in 
 
                                                 
16 Korpi (1983), Mahoney & Thelen (2010) p. 8, Knight (1992) p. 84ff, 210. 
17 Kori & Palme (1998), Esping-Andresen (1990). 
18 Kori & Palme (2003) p. 428. 
19 Korpi (2006) p. 172. 
20 Navarro (1989) p.  
21 Korpi & Palme (2003) p. 427.   9 
Bolivia by focusing on the struggle between organised interests representing different socio-
economic groups.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The “logic of the situation” makes those with limited resources to cope with life-course risks 
particularly disposed to promote universal welfare state institutions through collective action. 
 
3.2 State centred approach 
Within PRA the state is primarily seen as an arena were the conflicts between socio-economic 
groups are played out. In response to these and other instrumentalist and functionalist views on 
the state, scholars came to emphasise the importance of looking at the state as a cause of 
political outcomes.
22 The state is seen to matter in two ways; first, states may be  sites of 
“autonomous political action”, with bureaucrats pursuing their own and their organisations’ 
interests. Secondly, states matter because they shape the meanings and methods of politics for 
those groups engaged in the struggle over new policies.
23 The ability of states to pursue their 
agendas is moreover dependent on their capacity to formulate and implement new policies.
24
  State authorities have by some scholars been seen to pursue their goals according 
to organisational interest, especially in authoritarian-bureaucratic states, with a tendency to 
expand public expenditure  as  far as their financial and human capacities allow.
 
25 However, 
states may also pursue goals that are beyond their reach, with ambiguous and unintended 
outcomes as the result. Apart from administrative-military control over its’ territory; financial 
resources as well as loyal and skilled officials are often deemed important for the state’s capacity 
to pursue its’ goals.
 26
  As for the impact of political institutions, the existence of strong veto points for 
those seeking to preserve the status quo might block processes of change. In work on the 
welfare state,  federalism, bicameralism and presidentialism have been noted to constitute 
potentially important institutional veto points, which might be used to block or slow down 
welfare state reform by dispersion of policy making authority.
 
27 But as scholars focusing on 
gradual processes of institutional change has noted, the existence of strong veto-points might 
also make advocates of change adopt more covert strategies in order to obtain their goals.
 28
                                                 
22 Skocpol (1985) p 9. 
 
23 Orloff & Skocpol (1984) p 730f. 
24 Skocpol (1985) p 9. 
25 Skocpol & Amenta (1986) p. 149f. 
26 Skocpol (1985) p 16. 
27 Bonoli (2001)Immergut (1992). 
28 Mahoney & Thelen (2010) p. 18ff.   10 
  The political struggles over the redistribution of recourses and political control in 
Bolivia, can accordingly be analysed in the light of the interplay between government action and 
interest group formation. Moreover, the claim that the state can be seen as an autonomous 
actor in the process of policy formulation will be assessed throughout the case study as it 
represents a point of divergence with PRA and other society-oriented approaches. 
 
Hypothesis 2: State bureaucrats will pursue autonomous policy goals for personal or organisational benefit. 
Hypothesis 3: The existence of strong institutional veto-points will make a comprehensive reform less likely. 
 
3.3 Ideas and policy diffusion 
Recently, there are signs of an increasing concern with the unfair characteristic of the current 
process of globalisation, and a renewed interest in the social dimension of development seems 
to be emerging  on a global level, allowing for higher levels of public spending and state 
intervention.
29
  In studies on the development of welfare state institutions in advance-capitalist 
societies, domestic political and structural  factors  prevail.  As well, scholars interested in 
institutional change have mainly studied the effects of the existing institutions without paying 
more explicit attention to the generation of alternatives.
 In light of these trends the Bolivian case might be illustrative of the way in which 
the diffusion of policy ideas on a global level is tied to the struggle over the distribution of 
resources in society. 
30
  The processes of policy diffusion are of various kinds. Dobbin et al review the 
mechanism by which public policies spread across nations and come across four main 
currents.
 The global level is highlighted in this 
thesis as a source of alternative ideas and as an arena for struggles over the design of social 
policies. The global level might be particularly important in developing countries like Bolivia, 
dependent on foreign debt and external funding for the promotion of costly public policy.  
31 Constructivists tend to emphasise social emulation  through the example set by an 
influential policy  leader, theoretisation by expert groups or contingent arguments from 
specialists as the main mechanisms diffusing policies. Others focus on coercion brought about by 
conditionality, policy leadership or ideological hegemony.
 32
                                                 
29 Rittich (2007) p. 108. 
 A third current emphasises the role 
of competition for the convergence of public policy between countries. Finally, some scholars 
emphasise learning processes which changes policy-makers beliefs about causes and effects. 
30 Weyland (2007) p. 232, cf. Clemens & Cook (1999) p .459f. 
31 Dobbins et al (2007). 
32 See for example Armanda, Muntaner & Navarro (2001) p. 731.   11 
Kurt Weyland argues that learning processes are in turn structured by cognitive shortcuts used 
by public decision makers; such as availability, representativeness and anchoring.
33
  Weyland also argues that the adoption of similar health care reforms in Latin 
America can be understood as results of policy diffusion through a combination of pressures 
from IFIs and the emergence of new normative appeals.
  
34 The complexity of issues related to 
health care means that the outright copying of an entire model or blueprint is unlikely to prevail 
as the primary mechanism of policy diffusion; rather,  it has been the diffusion of general 
principles which has influenced decision makers in this area, exemplified by the widespread 





Hypothesis  4: The policies adopted will emulate policies pursued by other governments and international 
organisations. 
 
3.4 Institutional change and path dependency 
Researchers studying welfare state institutions has noted how social policies, when implemented, 
have feedback effects on future policy making.
36 This has resulted in many examples of studies 
focusing on how the selection of one or another diverging path influences later developments, 
makes  change path dependent.
37 The moments of transition  preceding the lock-in of an 
institutionalised political pattern,  when a number of diverging paths are seen as possible 
outcomes, are typically described as critical junctures, often associated with exogenous chocks.
38 
However, this framework is criticised for lacking important theoretical components which 
would enable it to explain gradual transformation of institutions, and to include endogenous 
sources of change.
39 In contrast, growing number of theorists studying institutional change have 
concerned themselves with explaining how transformative processes evolving over time has 
made retrenchment and privatisation possible in advanced capitalist economies.
 40
                                                 
33 Weyland (2006) p. 16. 
  
34 Weyland (2006) p. 180. 
35 Weyland (2006) p. 143. 
36 Korpi & Palme (1998), Esping-Andresen (1990) and Skocpol & Amenta (1986), Weyland (2006) p. 232,.see also 
Pierson (2004). 
37 Mahoney (2000), Pierson (2000). 
38 Collier & Collier (1991), Pierson (2004) p. 135. 
39 Mahoney & Thelen (2010) p. 5. 
40 For important theoretical contributions see Streek & Thelen (2005), Mahoney & Thelen (2010) and Pierson 
(2004).    12 
  The Bolivian case, however, provides us with an example of increased state 
intervention, government regulation and public provision of social services, contrary to the 
tendencies highlighted by studies in advanced capitalist societies. This thesis thus highlights the 
importance of developing theories capable of explaining how path dependent processes might 
result in an extension of social rights. 
  Building on previous research on temporal political processes, the task is seen as 
identifying the constraint placed on political action by institutions while simultaneously 
incorporating a dynamic component in the conceptualisation of institutions in order to generate 
a theoretical framework capable of accounting both for change and stability. In order to asses 
the ambiguous role of institutions, the following hypothesis is added to the study. 
 
Hypothesis  5: Policies introduced at an earlier stage will have significant implications for the subsequent 
development, resulting in a path dependent political process. 
3.5 Previous research and the causes of divergence in healthcare reform 
Research on welfare state institutions and their evolution and change over time has been a 
growing field during several decades. One of the most important dimensions of any welfare 
state, both in economical terms as well as in terms of impact on the welfare of the population, is 
the health care system. Researchers have emphasised different causes for the development and 
reform of these complex institutions. For example, a study by Vicente Navarro shows how the 
labour movement has been the protagonist in promoting universalism, state control and 
progressive taxation; thereby enabling the provision of health care services outside of market 
relations. Accordingly, where labour and its political parties have been most influential, health 
care systems to a larger extent tend to be universal and publicly managed.
41 Others have rather 
tended to explain the emergence, and divergence, of healthcare systems by pointing to how 
existing institutions and historical legacies shape the development of health care policies. James 
Hacker emphasises the historical and institutional aspects of the development of healthcare 
systems. The form the developing system takes is, according to this perspective, dependent on 
“market structures, policy ideas, interest group strategies and public views that have formed in 
response to previous government policies”.
42
                                                 
41 Navarro (1989). 
 Ellen Immergut has in turn shown how political 
institutions have effects on the development of national health insurance, thus explaining the 
divergence between countries. She asserts the importance of the mechanisms which transmits 
social pressures to political-decision makers, focusing on the institutional frame within which 
42 Hacker (1989).   13 
decisions are made.
43 In another study, Collins et al emphasise the importance of contextual 
factors for understanding the process of decision-making in relation to healthcare reform, with 
healthcare institutions responding to socio-economic, political, demographical and 
epidemiological changes.
44
  Throughout the twentieth century most Latin American countries have embarked 
on some form of reform of the health care sector. There has been a high level of diversity in 
terms of when reforms where introduced, the character of the reforms and their degree of 
implementation.
 
45 Reforms have on many occasions been parallel to the more general structural 
adjustments introduced in Latin America during the 1980s and 90s, and have often been 
designed according to the dominant neoliberal ideology with a predominance of financial 
considerations.
46
  Domestic actors such as health professionals, hospital and social insurance 
administrators as well as labour unions have generally been opponents of market oriented, 
efficiency enhancing reforms.
 
47 These groups have instead, often in coalitions with political 
parties seeking electoral support by promoting equity enhancing distributive  reforms, 
promoted the expansion of public health expenditures. The conflicts of interests among 
actors have led to a divergence of emphasises in different countries, often as the result of 
political compromises.
48
  The causes of healthcare reform are complex and the explanations proposed in 
the research literature are diverse. However, it is seldom claimed that states are to be analysed 
independently from their socio-economic and cultural contexts. Rather, the importance of 




  How can we understand the formation of coalitions on social policy reform in a 
developing region such as Latin America? Isabela Mares and Mattew Carnes have elaborated a 
 As well, the formation and capacities of classes and interest groups can be 
analysed as  dependent on the structure and activities of the state they seek to influence. 
Simultaneously, there is a need for greater integration of research focused on interests and 
institutions with that concerned with the impact of ideas and the importance of alternatives for 
the outcome of reforms. 
                                                 
43 Immergut (1993). 
44 Collins et al (1999). 
45 For an overview see Mesa-Lago (2009) p. 155ff. 
46 Mesa-Lago (2009) p. 162, Levcovitz (2006) p. 3. 
47 Homedes & Ugalde (2005) p. 3f. 
48 Mesa-Lago (2009) p. 162, Weyland (2006) p. 168. 
49 Esping-Andersen (1990), Korpi & Palme (2003) p. 431.   14 
theory linking the design of social policy to the de-industrialisation of the economy.
50 De-
industrialisation is defined as a process where manufacturing and agriculture are losing in 
importance to a growing service sector, which to a greater extent than the traditional sectors is 
characterised by informal working conditions. According to Carnes and Mares, contracted or 
formal labour has a preference for social policy programs where benefits are linked to 
contributions, thus securing a higher level of benefits. Accordingly informal labour is assumed 
to opt for a provision of benefits based on general taxation, granting access to benefits also to 
non-contributors. In the presence of existing social insurance institutions where entitlements 
are tied to contributions, a cleavage emerges between insiders concerned with the preservation 
of their benefits and outsiders seeking to change the design of the existing institutions.
51 The 
formation of strategic alliances are thus of importance for the political outcomes, with 
organised formal sector workers as a pivotal group able to form coalitions with low-income 
groups favouring greater redistribution, or allying themselves with high income earners in 
opposing redistribution. The possibility of defendants of the status quo to oppose social policy 
reform will moreover depend on other factors, such as linkages to political parties and the 
existents of institutional veto-points.
52
  Integrating agency and institutions within the same theoretical framework may 
significantly alter the expectations that we draw from theory then if each dimension would be 
studied separately.  An important contribution by this thesis will thus be to highlight the 
relationship between institutions, ideas and interests formation by explicitly account for how 
our understanding of the interests or ideas underlying policy reform is altered by taking 
institutions into account. 
 Such an approach to the investigation of preference 
formation and the impact of structural, political and institutional factors on the process of social 
policy reform seems like a fruitful starting point of further inquiry. 
 
 
                                                 
50 Carnes & Mares (2010).  
51 This tendency has been duly noted in studies on welfare state reform in Latin America. See for example 
Barrientos (2004) p. 160. 
52 Mares & Carnes (2009).   15 
4 Method 
4.1 Theory development and within-case analysis 
There is an ongoing debate over the appropriateness of different methodological approaches as 
ways to test and develop theories.
53 On the one hand, statistical methods, depending on 
correlation of variables, have been widely used in social science research and are the basis of 
many of the works cited earlier in this thesis. On the other hand, focusing on comparison 
between a small number of cases or even a single case have emerged as a useful strategy in 
order to identify the casual mechanisms connecting cause and effect.
54
  One can distinguish between different forms of causal processes, of which the 
simplest is a linear chain of events linked by direct causation. However, most social phenomena 
are characterised by complex causality where the outcome is the result of the convergence of 
several conditions or the interactions between different causal factors. When this type of 
causation is assumed, historical analysis has several advantages as compared to statistical 
methods. The Bolivian health care reform in this case is analysed as path dependent process, 
where key decisions and branching points foreclose certain paths of development, making the 
temporal dimension and interaction effects important for the eventual outcomes.  
 
  A theoretically informed historical analysis, and specifically a approach resembling 
process tracing and systematic process analysis as proposed by Peter A. Hall and Alexander 
George and Andrew Bennet, is used in this study to map the sequence of events as they unfold, 
allowing for the identification of path dependent processes and interaction effects.
  55 The 
general procedure of this type of approach is identifying the relevant causal factors and how 
they operate from theory, make as many observations as possible and thereafter compare these 
with the predictions made by theory in order to determine which theoretical explanation that 
best capture the observed pattern.
56 Moreover the study uses within-case analysis to make 
multiple observations within a case in order to infer causality by paying attention to sequence 
and using within-case comparison in order to identify  the mechanism  that transfers the 
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4.2 Causal mechanisms and context 
Causal mechanisms are often confounded with intervening variables and their specification is 
often reduced to  ”simply […] appealing to another correlation of observed variables”.
58 In 
contrast, Tulia G. Falleti and Julia Lynch suggest that causal mechanisms should be understood 
as relational concepts telling us how things happen defining them as “portable concepts that 
explain how and why a hypothesized cause, in a given context, contributes to a particular 
outcome”.
59 Moreover, they broadly define the context to be taken into account when studying 
social phenomena as “the relevant aspects of a setting (analytical, temporal, spatial, or 
institutional) in which a set of initial conditions leads (probabilistically) to an outcome of a 
defined scope and meaning via a specified causal mechanism or set of causal mechanisms”.
60 
This definition leads us to conclude that any  causal chain is  embedded in a set  of social, 
economic, cultural and political conditions, which influence the trajectory of any given causal 
process. The elaboration of a coherent narrative makes it possible to contextualise the process 
under study at any given stage, incorporating the effects of the context on the workings of a 
causal mechanism.
61
  Taking path dependence into account, institutional change may occur because 
transitions take place in different domains in an asynchronous manner. A possible way to 
identify how interactions and encounters among processes in different institutional realms open 





present case study of Bolivian health care politics is analysed using such a multilayered 
framework, identifying socioeconomic, political and institutional layers influenced by separate 
processes, thereby creating frictions which shape the processes of institutional change. The 
present analysis also pays close attention to the sequencing and timing of events, in order to 
account for the impact of policy legacies and feedback effects, placing the process of change in 
a historical perspective. 
4.3 Actors and context 
The strategies of actors engaging in processes of institutional change are within institutionalist 
research seen to be dependent on the political context in which this process takes place, as well 
as the characteristics of the targeted institutions. These characteristics make the presence of 
                                                 
58 Mahoney (2001) p. 578. 
59 Falleti & Lynch (2009) p. 1147. 
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61 Büthe (2002) p. 490. 
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certain types of change agents more likely in certain contexts, associated with the specific 
strategy employed by these agents.
63 The setting in which struggles over institutional change 
takes place also influences which coalitions are formed in defence or opposition to the status 
quo.
64 For example, when identifying relevant coalitions, insights are drawn on how generative 
cleavages in society lead up to a transformative process.
65
  An important remark stemming from the theoretical framework presented above 
is  that the interests of actors cannot simply be read of their actions, but must instead be 
evaluated by referring to the logic of the situation. Because actions might respond to second 
order preferences and be the result of strategic behaviour, Walter Korpi has suggested a 
typology of actors based on their role in the expansion of social citizenship rights, labelling 
those initiating the process of institutional change as protagonists, those actively opposing it as 
antagonists  and those how become involved first in subsequent stages of the policy making 




 This way of thinking about actors’ 
strategies, as dependant on the power structures and institutions surrounding them,  is 
incorporated into the analysis. This insight is emphasised here as it is deemed important for 
how method of analysis when interests and influence is ascribed to the actors engaging in 
redistributive conflicts. 
4.4 Data collection: Elite interviewing, documents and literature 
In order to study preferences and actions of different actors and in order to generate data on 
the many turns of the development of policing health care policy, interviews were carried out 
with representatives of organisations involved in this process, government officials and 
observers of the process working in fields related to public policy or health care.
67 The purpose 
of the interviews was partly to corroborate information obtained from other, written sources, to 
establish the perspectives taken by different actors on the issue under investigation and most 
importantly to reconstruct the set of events leading up to the identified propositions of 
reforms.
68
                                                 
63 Mahoney & Thelen (2010) p. 18ff. 
 The respondents were chosen on the basis of their position in relation to the process 
under study, choosing respondents who are particularly well informed about the issue or actors 
64 Hall (2010) p. 206f. 
65 Collier & Collier (1991). 
66 Korpi (2006) p. 182. 
67 Interviews are mentioned by George and Bennett as one of the primary research tools to be used when applying 
the process tracing method (2005) p. 6. 
68 The use of interviews as a method of data collection contributes to shedding light on elements of the political 
process which are difficult to unravel looking only at outcomes or written sources. See Tansey (2007) p. 766.   18 
who are central to the decision-making process. However, representatives of all actors involved 
have not been interviewed resulting in asymmetries in the data as a result. This problem has 
however been tackled by incorporating written sources which could account for the aspects not 
covered by the interviews.
69
  The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured fashion, meaning that a set of 
questions was elaborated, but that these mainly served as a guide setting the framework for the 
conversations that developed. The questions also provided a checklist of theoretically relevant 
issues seeking their answers. The main reason for not choosing a more structured method of 
interviewing was a wish not to let any preconceptions determine the answers, this allowed the 
interviews to incorporate new variables and perspectives which could have been lost if a more 
narrow scheme had been applied. However, using open ended questions also have set-backs; 
answers might be difficult to compare to those of other respondents or written sources and 
long elaborations on matters deemed important by the respondent might divert attention from 
the themes which are the focus of the study. As well the biased positions of the respondents 
might influence the results of the study, an aspect dealt with by viewing the actors under study 




  The analysis of the Bolivian health care reform also builds on written documents 
from various sources. Documents have been gathered during the field study and throughout the 
phase of writing this thesis, and include accounts from Bolivian authors on the development of 
the Bolivian social insurance system, articles from the press, and official documents. These 
documents are read selectively, focusing on the most relevant parts, and their descriptions on 
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5 Case study: The right to healthcare in Bolivia 
5.1 The origins of social insurance 
Through the revolution in 1952, the labour movement entered in a cross-class alliance with 
urban middle classes  and the peasants’ movement, which granted the then newly founded 
Workers Central Union (COB) influence over  the  government.  The revolution thus  gave 
organised labour a momentum and shifted the power balance in society, disfavouring the 
traditional oligarchy and empowering the emerging labour movement and middle classes, with 
important institutional changes as a result. However, the labour movement never came to be 
united politically through a workers’ party; instead they supported the governments of the 
populist Nationalist Revolutionary Movement (MNR). While the peasants’ movement 
supported the revolution and managed to push through an agrarian reform, the influence of the 
indigenous rural population over the government remained elusive.
71
  The Bolivian social security law was passed in 1956, signalling the inception of the 
country’s social security system. The legislation was conceived in the aftermath of the national 
revolution of 1952, during the presidency of Hernán Siles Suazo.
 
72 It was elaborated through a 
collaboration of representatives from the International Labour Organisation (ILO), national 
specialists and a committee of deputies. The law included sickness, maternity, old age, work 
injury and family benefits as well as social housing, and was to be funded by contributions from 
employers, employees and the government. However, already in 1951, the law on Obligatory 
Social Insurance had created the National Social Security Fund granting provisions to workers 
and their families, after a proposal drafted by a technical commission with representatives from 
the Spanish government and influenced by the Iberian-American Social Security Organisation 
(OISS) and building on previous labour market regulations.
73
  The development of social insurance following the national revolution of 1952 
clearly illustrates a phase during which the organised working class may indeed be labelled 
protagonists in this process of welfare state expansion. The institutions were changed following 
a significant empowerment of the popular classes through the formation of a cross class alliance 
including workers, peasants and the middle classes and the universalisation of suffrage realised 
by the revolution. However, the corporatist character of social insurance reflects a heritage from 
previous arrangements and the influence from the ILO, OISS and other foreign representatives, 
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as well as the concentration of salaried workers to a few mining centres which diminished the 
base for truly universal policies. 
 
5.2 Labour market and social policy dualism 
At the time of inception of the social insurance system, state driven industrialisation was 
thought to foment the formalisation of the labour market resulting in a gradual extension of 
social security to the entire population. Labour market dualism is however a persistent feature 
of the social reality of contemporary Bolivia  due to ambiguous processes of economic 
development and de-industrialisation.  
  Due to the competition from external markets, small peasants have growing 
difficulties to sustain their families from the incomes generated by their farming activities. 
Simultaneously, production on bigger farms has become more capital-intense, diminishing the 
demand for labour power in rural areas and generating an increasing urbanisation.
74 These 
pressures have caused peasant production to fall steadily as a share of total agricultural 
production from 82,2 percent in 1963 to 39,5 percent in 2002.
75
  Characteristics of the changes in the Bolivian labour market following the politics 
of structural adjustment introduced during the 1980s were sub-contractation of work to smaller 
non-unionised workplaces and a sharp reduction in public employment, which was  not 
compensated for by the formal private sector.
  
76 Even within the formal sectors short term and 
temporal contracts have become increasingly important, making work more precarious and 
excluding many salaried workers from the social heath insurance system.
77  Although 
unemployment has remained at relatively low levels, underemployment has become an 
increasingly important phenomenon,
78 and the Bolivian labour market now has the highest level 
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  Source: Own elaboration based on data from ECLAC/CEPALSTAT. 
 
The high levels of informality do not only imply that only a small part of the population enjoys 
the benefits associated with stable full-time employment, such as the right to social health 
insurance, but it also has several implications for the capacity of unions to mobilise for the 
extension of benefits. This process significantly weakened the position of the once so vocal 
Bolivian labour movement, articulated trough the COB.
80
  The inability of the national health system to satisfy the health needs of the 
population has thereby lead to a change in the course of politics through the accumulation of 
failure.
  
81 As we shall se in the following section, this has led to a negative diagnosis of the health 
care system, shared by a majority of the actors involved. The corporatist health insurance funds 
have however remained largely intact, resisting attempts both towards privatisation and 
socialisation. This development points to the benefits of conceptualising the inception of social 
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Source: Own elaboration based on INASES (2009): Anuario Estadístico 2009. 
 
The  changes in the Bolivian labour market  point towards an increasing importance of an 
informal sector in urban areas, at the same time as important parts of the population remains in 
the countryside, where the incidence of extreme poverty reaches 63,9 percent.
83 However, the 
low coverage of social insurance is not a new phenomenon in Bolivia and coverage levels of the 
contributory system have tended to increase, albeit slowly, despite high levels of informality. As 
the following chapter shows targeted non-contributory programs directed towards previously 
excluded segments of the population have been gradually expanded during the 1990s and the 
current universal policies have indeed been launched following an increase in labour market 
informality during the first part of the 2000s. The relationship indicated by this correlation 
needs to be associated with a mechanism in order to be labelled causal. This decline of formal 
work creation and thereby traditional labour’s capacity to mobilise has indeed been parallel to 
an increasing mobilisation of the peasant and informal sectors, often with an ethnic character. 
Bolivia is a highly divided society in terms of ethnicity, with 39 ethnic groups gathered in a 
country nowadays labelling itself as plurinational. With a majority of the population auto-
defining themselves as indigenous
84
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 and with social organisations labelling themselves likewise 
exerting increasing levels of political influence, social mobilisation on ethnic grounds has 
become  an important feature of Bolivian political processes. The marginalisation of the 
indigenous population has serious implications for the access of these groups to adequate 
healthcare. For example in the Chiquisaca department, 74 percent of the population is 
84 Webber (2011) p. 1.   23 
indigenous and the incidence of poverty is 70 percent. Simultaneously the coverage of social 
insurance is only 18 percent, the lowest in the country.
85
 
 The convergence between the ethnic 
and socio-economic cleavages in the Bolivian society makes ethnically motivated mobilisation 
an important feature of class based political action, but the formal/informal cleavage is also 
reflected in  tensions between sectors. The largest peasants’  organisation, the CSUTCB, is 
moreover part of the COB, but the relationship within this alliance is associated with tension 
due to the division of power within the confederation, which by tradition is governed by mining 
sector workers. 
5.4 Continuity and change in healthcare policy 
Despite the tendencies towards de-industrialisation, the social security law from 1956 is still in 
force, albeit with important modifications, and social health insurance has grown to become the 
most important subsystem in the Bolivian national health system, accounting for almost 40 
percent of total funding in 2009.
86
  This salience of social insurance can be explained by the way that social polices 
structure the interests of the  polity towards the existing institutions. The existence of 
fragmented social insurance with a number of  independent institution protecting formal 
workers in case of sickness has impacts on the preferences of these workers. The uncertainty 
involved with changing the institutional arrangement put in place detracts desirability of the 
protected workers from embarking on path departing reforms. The lack of financial support 
from the government and even reluctance from the state to make the proper contributions 
demanded from it as an employer has over time fostered a feeling of apartness  of those 
defending the independence of the social insurance funds. This has led to a defensive stance of 
working class organisations and fortified resistance to later attempts from the government to 
intervene in the funds. Also, the number of entities administering social insurance has increased 
over the years, from three originally to eight today, and with fragmentation and political 
interference the funds has become major cites of patronage, nepotism and corruption.
 As with state-corporatist institutions in Europe, the Bolivian 
health insurance system has proven to be highly resistant to change. 
87
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Moreover, the corporatist model institute the sector based unions as important veto-players in 
healthcare reform. These traits have contributed to a mechanism of reproduction of the social 
insurance funds through the mobilisation of personalised, organisational and sector-based 
86 WHO (2011).  
87 Bocangel (2004) p. 69.   24 
interests. However, on top of the contributory system, a public subsystem gradually expanded 
through a process resembling what Kathleen Thelen and others have called layering.
88
  Since the reinstallation of democracy in 1982, after a series of military 
governments, the government of the left wing party Democratic and Popular Unity (UDP), 
with Hernán Siles Suazo as president for the second time introduced the concept of health as a 
human right and launched several public programs, including health brigades in rural areas, 
vaccination campaigns and free medical care at childbirth. Also, popular participation at the 
local level was fomented through the creation of popular health councils. The focus of this 
period was to a large extent inspired by the diffusion of the principles of the International 
Conference on Primary Health Care held in Alma Ata in 1978.
 
89
  Starting in 1989, propelled by increased efforts to enhance policy diffusion by IOs, 
a number of public programs  with a targeted  focus  directed towards the precarious health 
situation of women and infants were launched. These were managed by the Ministry of Health 
with important financial contributions from the WB and the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB), and with technical assistance from WHO and UNICEF.
 As well, the popular 
characteristics of the government can be seen as a result of the reintroduction of electoral 
democracy and the sustained struggle by popular organisations against military rule. Although 
political instability and economic crisis during the 1980s hindered many of these efforts to be 
further deepened, they marked the introduction of the principles of primary care in Bolivian 
health care politics and would come to influence the future development of public programs in 
the country. By introducing and deepening public programs focusing on rural areas, there was a 
growing affinity between medical professionals  devoted to social medicine and social and 
community organisations. Processes of socialisation  both on a local level and through the 
influence of IOs thus fostered the expansion of public engagement in primary health care. 
90 In 1994, during the 
first presidency of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, a basic package of 25 services free of charge to 
all pregnant women and children under the age of five was introduced.
.91 It was partly funded 
by public funds from the national treasury, which had been transferred to the municipalities as a 
part of the move towards a more decentralised state structure.
92
                                                 
88 Mahoney & Thelen (2010), Streek & Thelen (2005). 
 Parallel to the introduction of 
public programs focused on maternal and child health, another set of reforms were introduced 
in order to provide healthcare to the older segments of the population, at a first stage to all 
citizens above the age of 65 and later also including those above 60. By gradually introducing 
89 Interview: Crespo (2011), WHO (1978). 
90 OPS (2002) p. 4, Interview: Aguilár (2011), Interview: Cuentas (2011). 
91 Galindo Soza (2010) p. 16. 
92 Ibid.   25 
modifications to these programs a system of public insurance schemes was gradually expanded 
between 1994 and 2006. 
  In 1997 The  Ministry of Health launched a special  health reform project, 
managed by a WB financed project team and thus heavily influenced by the bank’s agenda. The 
focus the reforms introduced during the presidency of Hugo Banzer and Jorge Quiroga was 
explicitly to enhance equity in the health care system but it retained an emphasis on targeting 
towards the most vulnerable groups in society.  Particularly, the reforms  followed the 
recommendations of the WB to focus on malnutrition, communicable diseases, childhood 
illnesses, high fertility, and maternal and perinatal conditions; targeting resources to where their 
use was thought to be most effective.
93
  These gradual reforms were introduced by Supreme Decrees and incorporated 
the municipalities only on voluntary basis through the signing of particular agreements. Thereby, 
potential veto-points were bypassed, avoiding regional opposition. However, this also meant 
that the healthcare programs remained vertical and that the structures envisaged by the reforms 
were not comprehensively implemented or regulated.
  
94
  An important change came in 2003 with the introduction of the Universal Mother 
and Child Insurance (SUMI)
 
95 which has a more universal character in terms of provisions, 
thereby breaking the emphasis on a minimal package as advocated by WB.
96 SUMI has three 
sources of funding: the national treasury, the municipalities and the National Solidarity Fund.
97 
The law stipulates the right of all pregnant women and all children up to the age of five the 
right to basically any health service,
98 and this time the reform was established by law thus 
consolidating the system of public insurance schemes.
99 Efforts to extend the scope and 
functionality of the existing programs were made during the 2003-2005 period, partly through 
the WB supported program EXTENSA, deploying health teams in rural areas, but these were 
largely unsuccessful due to political instability and fiscal constraints.
100
  As illustrated by the reforms referred to above, the national health system evolved 
through a series of amendments to the old system, surpassing the limits of contributory 
insurance and  gradually strengthened the government’s capacity to regulate and execute a 
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national health care policy. Through layering of institutional rules, a network of public health 
facilities developed throughout the country, due to expanding primary health programs and the 
decentralisation of responsibilities to the municipalities. This expansion of public healthcare 
programs also coincides with changes in the state structure as well as in the state-society 
relationship. In order to analyse the emergence of a new momentum in healthcare policy we 
therefore turn to this processes in the following section. 
 
5.5 A new political context: decentralisation and social mobilisation 
Following the reforms of  the state structure and the introduction of laws on popular 
participation and decentralisation, there has been a gradual incorporation of community based 
interest organisations into Bolivian state-society relations. By launching their own platforms, 
social organisations started to challenge the traditional political parties, initially at the local level 
and later nationally, provoking the breakdown of the previous party system.
101
  However, state capacity has been weak both in terms of legitimacy and financial 
capacity, which has refrained the government from launching more radical reform proposals. 
Since the 1980s Bolivia had a large external debt and the economy experienced only slow 
growth while the government was running a deficit during the first years of the 21
st century.
 The power 
resources of the informal and agrarian sectors seem to be enhanced by several institutional 
factors. First, the re-installation of democracy enhanced the efficacy of the power resources of 
these sectors through the extension of suffrage. As well, a decentralised state-structure gives 
community based organisations increased influence over public policy making. This extension 
of the state to areas previously alienated from state politics also generated a political logic which 
turned community based organisations towards political action and involvement in public 
decision-making.  These movements represented communities excluded from access to the 
health care system, making claims about the improvement of living conditions in their 
communities, including health care. Thus, increasing political competition came to account for 
an interest from politicians to expand the existing programs, sometimes opposing the strict 
targeting promoted by IFIs. 
102
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Between 2000 and 2005 there was also continuous social unrest and political instability. The 
weak capacity of the Bolivian state facilitated the entry of the WB and other IOs, whose 
concern have mostly been with improving the efficiency and efficacy of the system and not with 
comprehensive reform. Moreover, the presence of a number of political parties in the legislative 
102 Weisbrot, Ray & Johnston (2009).   27 
assembly during this period made the congress and senate potential veto-points were more 
comprehensive reform could be blocked. 
  This was the background to the emergence of MAS-IPSP as the dominant force 
in Bolivian party politics. In the 2005 elections Evo Morales, the leader of MAS-IPSP and a 
former peasants’ union leader and deputy in congress, gained the presidency with 54 percent of 
the votes. The party also managed to gain a majority in the national congress, but won only 12 
of 27 senators, thus giving the opposition the possibility to veto the government’s proposals. 
Also, MAS-IPSP only gained three of nine departmental prefectures. This situation made the 
governing party forced to negotiate new legislation with the opposition both on a national and 
regional level, with implications for the development of new health care policies. An important 
leverage of the nine regional departments stems from their control of the revenue from the 
Direct Tax on Hydrocarbons (IDH) introduced by the Morales government. 
  MAS-IPSP is strictly speaking not a political party, but a vehicle for a coalition of 
social organisations representing peasants and indigenous peoples, and has gained electoral 
support of the traditional labour unions. A new cross-class alliance thus seem to have emerged, 
including peasants’ and indigenous peoples’ organisations in coalition with organised labour and 
an urban left wing middle class, with significant tensions arising between the different factions 
within the MAS-IPSP.  
  Following the widespread mobilisations during the first years of this century, 
constitutional reform was brought forward by the social organisations as a principal objective. 
Also, sector specific pre-constitutional assemblies were set up in order to elaborate new policies 
which would form the base of a new constitution. Departmental assemblies were carried out in 
all departments, conformed to 70 percent by representatives of social organisations and to 30 
percent by representatives of the health care system, to discuss the status of health in the new 
constitution. These were followed by a national assembly in 2006 in Sucre, were a document 
was elaborated, drawing up the guidelines for the new constitutional paragraphs on health.
103
  The process of constitutional reform was interwoven with the elaboration of new 
polices for the health sector. Healthcare for all was a part of the electoral campaign which 
brought Morales to the presidency in 2005, although the issue was largely overshadowed by the 
nationalisation of natural resources and the promotion of indigenous people’s political rights. 
The new strategy identified by the MSD during the first year of the new government pointed to 
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the state as a protector of the universal  right to health and emphasised the importance of 
recognising cultural diversity and popular participation as parts of a new sanitary model.
 104
  The new constitution, adopted in 2009, after being approved in a referendum in 
December 2008 recognises health as a fundamental right of all Bolivian citizens. The access to 
health care is to be guaranteed by the state. Furthermore, the constitution prescribes a universal 
unified healthcare system and the abolishment of out-of-pocket expenditure for public care.
 
105 
Also, government is given the responsibility to develop policies which improve access to free 
healthcare services and guarantee access of the entire population to a universal health insurance. 
Another article explicitly prohibits the privatisation of public health services.
106
  The new constitution was passed by bypassing potential institutional veto-points 
by the use of a referendum called at the discretion of the executive, thereby enhancing power 
concentration. The event shows how institutional constraints can be overcome by agency in the 
form of massive popular mobilisation  combined with a presidentialism  with populist 
characteristics.
 
 The direct 
references between the constitutional document and the programs elaborated by the MSD are 
results of the interwoven processes of state transformation and renovation of healthcare 
policies which have taken place during the last decade, with the redefinition of the state-society 
relationship underlying both. The political and administrative leadership, heavily influenced by 
the social medicine tradition and especially the Latin American Association of Social Medicine 
(ALAMES),  have also been active in the constitution-making process, thus generating this 
coherence of political goals and strategies. 
107
  One trajectory of the policy process can thus be traced from the demands raised 
by social organisations which eventually made their way into the electoral program of the MAS-
IPSP, reaching the status of government policy after the 2005 elections, and eventually making 




 Another path of policy 
influence emanates from the global level and the international flow of ideas and pressures 
discussed in the following section 
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5.6 Regional networks and policy diffusion 
As the events referred to earlier shows, IOs and foreign governments have been influential in 
healthcare politics due to the insufficient capacity of the Bolivian government to raise sufficient 
funds and plan the implementation of healthcare programs, especially during the 1990s. With 
the introduction of the structural adjustment programs, the more comprehensive primary care 
strategy introduced during the 1983-85 period was moulded into a more selective approach as 
promoted by the WB, IADB, WHO and UNICEF.
109
  Since 2005 Bolivia has had large shares of the country’s external debt cancelled as 
a result of the dept relief to Heavily Indebted Poor Countries program (HIPC), at the same time 
as the national economy has started to improve, thus diminishing the government’s dependence 
on foreign aid.
 
110 IOs are however still present in healthcare politics and the  WBs reform 
project has been partly continued through the  Expanding Access to Reduce Inequities in  Health 
project. The financing agreement states that the WB, through the International Development 
Association, is to assist the MSD with technical assistance and financing in matters such as 
advocacy of the ministry’s sectoral plan as well as for the rollout, planning, management, 
monitoring and evaluation of the proposed universal insurance.
111
  Perhaps most important among international influences for the development of 
healthcare policy in Bolivia today is instead the ALAMES, to which several of public officials in 
the MSD are linked.
 
 Thus, the WB does not seem 
to have opposed any of the ministry’s proposals, but rather been supportive of the reform 
agenda. 
112 The  organisation promotes the creation of universal  social security 
systems  financed through  progressive taxation, and interprets universalism  as a part of an 
amplified citizenship, a matter of government responsibility and of public predominance. Also, 
social mobilisation and popular participation are important components of reform according to 
ALAMES and the network promotes close collaboration with popular movements, also a core 
message of the current new Bolivian sanitary model.
113
  After the election of Evo Morales Bolivia became a part of the regional network 
called the Bolivarian Alternative for Our America – the Peoples’ Trade Agreement (ALBA-
TCP), founded by Cuba and Venezuela in 2004, which according to the MSD constitutes “a 
new regional framework for the cooperation and solidarity between the peoples”.
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framework 1921 Cuban doctors have been deployed in rural areas in Bolivia, providing 
healthcare without charges for services.
115 Within the ALBA, Venezuela is embarking on a 
similar path as Bolivia, with the construction of a universal National Public Health System built 
on an extension of the project Barrio Adentro.
116 The Cuban health care system is an example 
of a consolidated pure public system with a high profile in the region. Simultaneously, Cuba has 
recently reformed its’ system by increasing the emphasis on family health, a process which have 
been observed by Bolivian decision makers.
117
  However, this does not exclude that availability of healthcare policies pursued in 
other countries influence the decision-making in the Bolivian case. The development of a 
Unified health system in Brazil has also received attention and has served as an example of how 
universalisation can be pursued by emphasising the role of public provisioning.
 The collaboration within the ALBA framework 
might thus appear important by making already implemented health policy models available to 
Bolivian decision makers and by the influence of closer relationship of decision makers from 
the countries participating within this framework. However, the sequence of events rather 
implies a reverse causality between the composition and ideology of the Bolivian government 
and international collaboration. The healthcare policy of the MSD, MAS-IPSP and the public 
officials promoting universalism predates the closer relationships with Venezuela and Cuba. 
118 There have 
also been tendencies to observe the processes of unification of health care systems in 
industrialised countries, such as those that have taken place in southern Europe.
119
  These findings thus indicate that the Bolivian government has come to adopt a 
more independent relation towards global IOs and IFIs, but that the global dimension remains 
important for the process of policy diffusion. The regional networks show that not only cultural 
and geographic closeness promotes diffusion, but that this process also has a political 
dimension. This dimension has two implications on the diffusion of policy; first, that domestic 
power struggles shapes the emergence of networks and channels of policy diffusion on a global 
level, and therefore that, secondly, which models get attention by decision-makers is partly 
decided as a result of the outcome of these struggles. Although general ideas about efficiency 
and equity, spread by IOs and IFIs as well as the ALAMES, have been adopted by the MSD, 
there is also a tendency towards model diffusion as shown by the attention paid to the design of 
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5.7 A healthcare system at a point of path departure? 
The demands for the right to health for all and the necessity of unifying the health care system 
has not been disputed in the debate over health care policies, instead the diagnosis of failure of 
the Bolivian health care system is shared among the main actors.
 121
  The government program of the MAS-IPSP launched previous to the 2005 
elections, introduces expansion of the public sector to cover for the population not insured by 
social security as a first step towards a unified health care system.
 Rather, it is the organisation 
of the system in general, and its’ funding and redistribution of power in particular, which have 
been up to debate.  
122 After the 2005 elections, a 
universal public insurance was proposed in order to achieve universal access to the national 
health system. Fiscal constraints made the government suggest a first stage in 2007, extending 
access to free health care to all non-insured citizens up to 21 years of age. The extension was to 
be financed by a combination of the departmental and municipal funds complemented with 
resources from the National Solidarity Fund.
123 This proposition was however not passed by the 
senate due to the conflicts arising from the centralisation and redistribution of decentralised 
departmental resources included in the proposal.
124
  This instance illustrates how the process of decentralisation serves both as 
channel of  pressures for reform and an obstacle to national initiatives. On one hand, the 
process of decentralisation launched during the 1990s, an the subsequent transfer of funds to 
the municipalities paved the way for increased investments in primary health care facilities at the 
local level as a response to popular demands.
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oppositional forces, had already launched autonomous public health insurance programs with 
the funds from the IDH when the MSD brought its’ proposals for a universal insurance to the 
congress. On the other hand, the opposition to the governments’ proposed financing 
mechanism was able to halt its’ implementation by articulation of this resistance in the senate by 
121 Interview: Cuentas (2011). 
122 MAS-IPSP (2005). 
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forces demanding increased regional autonomy.  This backlash for the process of health 
insurance expansion also illustrates the conflicts involved in determining the mechanisms of 
financing, thus highlighting the redistributive aspects of institutional change. It also introduces 
the sub-national governments as important veto-players in the process of health sector reform 
and highlights the inter-regional tensions underlying the political debate in Bolivia. As well, it 
shows how the political institutions work to structure the process of reform and provide 
opponents of reform with a strong veto point in the national senate.  
  This moment was then followed by a period of partial reformulation of the 
priorities of the MSD parallel to new changes in the  political  context.  In 2008 a new 
constitution recognising the right to health as a fundamental right to be provided guaranteed by 
the state was approved by referendum. Also, with the passing of the new constitution autonomy 
was granted the departments, municipalities and indigenous communities
126
  After a decades of incremental reforms pushed forwards both by IOs and 
domestic politicians, the public subsystem has positioned itself as an important provider of 
healthcare services and an insurer, especially in rural areas where the social insurance system is 
weak. The position acquired by the public system has thus put the MSD in a position were it is 
seen as feasible by public officials to build a unified system on the existing public network, a 
situation much different from that during the return to democracy in 1982 when 
comprehensive reforms were considered in the light of the Ala Ata conference. 
 Increased electoral 
support for MAS-IPSP in the 2010 elections gained Evo Morales a second term as president 
and the party a majority of the seats in the chamber of deputies and the senate, as well as six 
instead of three departmental prefects.  This result has given  rise to increased power 
concentration  to  the executive, making opposition to government policy in the parliament 
inefficient. However, MAS-IPSP lost mayoral elections in important cities, including La Paz. 
Bargaining over the limits of regional and local autonomy is thus a continuing feature of 
Bolivian politics. 
  In 2010 the MSD launched a series of departmental health congresses were the 
new proposals for a unified healthcare system were debated and delegates were elected to a 
national health congress held in January 2011. During this national congress the proposition 
delineating the design of the new Unified Health System (SUS) was debated and agreed upon in, 
the presence of representatives from the health sector and social organisations.
127
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during this congress the refusal of the COB to participate, due to disagreements with the 
policies of the MSD, reflects the conflicts over the new reform.
128
  Primarily, MSD would like to have seen the healthcare funds integrated into a 
comprehensive public system. The proposal for the SUS from January 2011, however, states 
that the funds are to sign agreements with the MSD in order to coordinate their activities with 
the SUS and integrate them into the single system.
 
129 This somewhat vague formulation, 
allowing the health insurance funds some degree of independence within the reform, is the 
result of the conflicts which have arisen around the issue of the health insurance funds’ future, 
reflecting different sector based interest. However, this procedure with a public system covering 
those not insured by social insurance, corresponds to the first step towards a unified healthcare 




5.8 Protagonists and antagonists in the struggle over universalism 
The  public  officials within the MSD stand  out as clear protagonists in the process of 
universalisation. These often have strong ties to social organisations or left wing parties, and 
often claim to be working for the benefit of the entire population. The current government 
benefits from a wave of mobilisations of community based organisations in both urban and 
rural areas, and enjoys its’ strongest support form organisations representing the indigenous 
population. Urban organisations representing immigrants from the countryside and informal 
sector workers include for examples gremial organisations  and neighbourhood assemblies, 
reflecting the new forms of social mobilisation emerging in the country. Since the re-installation 
of democracy in 1982 Bolivia has seen a gradually increasing importance of peasant workers’ 
unions, women’s organisations and social organisations, with the extension of social rights on 
their agenda.
131
  Simultaneously, the primary and most articulate antagonists of healthcare reform 
are sector based interests whose positions are threatened by a decomposition of the social 
health insurance system. Doctors and medical workers fear reduced professional autonomy, 
rationalisations and system collapse, and coincide with the traditional labour movement over 
the risk of a deterioration of the quality of services if social insurance is to be integrated with 
the public subsector. The resistance of these movements to the MSDs policies most often takes 
the form of strikes, marches and blockades. In order to highlight these tensions, some 
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illustrations of the reactions of organised interests to the government initiatives are restated 
below.  
  As a move towards strengthening government control over the health insurance 
funds’ resources, the budgetary law for 2011 demands that the funds’ financial resources are 
deposited in accounts supervised by the ministry of finance.
  132 The union of doctors in the 
social insurance system (SIMRA)
  133 of La Paz has signed a joint statement with the COB, 
denouncing this move by the government. The SIMRA, as well as the COB, supports the idea 
of a unified health system with universal access on a general level but does not approve of an 
integration of the social insurance system with the public system, claiming that coverage of non-
contributing workers should be made by public funding and not with resources from the social 
insurance contributions.
134
  The resistance to healthcare reform coincided with a general strike  for raised 
salaries, carried out during ten days in April 2011, when the roads and city centres were blocked 
by demonstrators. During this strike the minister of health, Nila Heredia, was denounced for 
having an anti-worker posture. In response, the government launched the proposal of moving 
all public employees currently insured with the social health care funds  to  a new public 
insurance  scheme, and introduced the proposal of resolving the issue trough a national 
referendum.
 
135 Likewise, in March 2011 the professional organisation of doctors in Bolivia, the 
Colegio Médico, launched a twenty four hour strike opposing a new law regulating the medical 
profession,  but also the proposal for a unified healthcare system, disapproving of the 
incorporation of the social insurance funds with the public system.
136
  The trade unions are important stakeholders in the political process for a number 
of reasons. First, since the funds responsible for managing the social health insurance system 
are co-managed by representatives of the state, labour and employers, these instructions offer 
union representatives a channel of influence. Second, the COB perceives the social security 
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COB in mobilisations against reforms for fear of a collapse of the infrastructure built up by 
social insurance if contributions from this system are to fund the proposed reform. 
  Simultaneously, the role of private employers has been marginal throughout the 
policy making process. While the medicine industry has been noted to benefit from the present 
fragmentation of the system and thus show certain resistance to any attempts towards increased 
centralisation their impact on the policy making process is negligible.
138 As long as it does not 
imply an increased financial burden of employers in the form of new raised taxation or 
increased employer contributions,
  139
  Instead of traditional working class organisations, the health care reform has 
found its’ supporters within groups formerly excluded from social insurance.  Recently, the 
government has decided to abort all discussions on including particular sectors, favouring a 
universal approach to the process of increased access. In the discussions on the current reform 
proposals,  domestic service workers  for example,   who previously pushed for a sectorial 
agreement now have hopes of a unified system granting the right to health care for all who 
previously have been excluded.
 private enterprises can be labelled consenters  in the 
current process of reform. 
140
 
 As well, as the COB launched its’ general strike against the 
government, several indigenous organisations came out in defence of the governments general 
reform ambitions. 
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6 Conclusion  
What do theories of welfare states and institutional change tell us about the development of 
universal social policies in countries characterised by dual labour markets and entrenched 
contributory  social security institutions? The  tracing of the process of institutional change 
within Bolivian healthcare policy has highlighted a need to modify, or at least contextualise, 
some of the hypotheses drawn from theory.  
  Starting with the process of policy diffusion we have seen that the Bolivian 
reform agenda have been heavily influenced by external actors. The adoption of foreign ideas 
has however largely followed the development in domestic politics. As well, external influence 
seems to be most important when state capacity is reduced, as was the case in Bolivia during the 
1980s. Moreover, in the absence of heavy dependence of particular sources of external funding, 
ideological affinity and the composition of social organisations pushing for reform are  of 
primary importance for the type of policy that gets attention. As for the comprehensive reform 
proposed by the current  government,  the international influence has been more profound 
within civil society networks,  than within inter-government networks  such as ALBA.  The 
extension and influences of these non-state networks as well as the linkages between power and 
policy diffusion  thus stand out as important areas for further research. 
  An  orthodox  reading of the PRA might lead us to the conclusion that the 
emerging proletariat would be the protagonists in driving universalisation forward. The Bolivian 
case however, shows how the institutional context might put the labour movement in a position 
in defence of contributory social insurance, giving them the role as main antagonists of 
universalisation. Instead we have seen how an agrarian and urban informal class has formed a 
political instrument, promoting the extension of social rights. Indeed as T.H Marshall noted, 
social rights are “woven into the fabric of citizenship” as this citizenship is extended in a society 
characterised by material inequality.
141
  As for the hypotheses derived from the state-centred approach, the executive has 
indeed been protagonists in promoting public sector expansion. However, the strong ties 
between left wing parties, social organisations and the bureaucracy under Evo Morales have put 
the assumption of bureaucratic autonomy into question. While the public officials may indeed 
have an interest in increased spending, it appears that the formulation of a comprehensive 
 This process is highly related to the transformation of 
political institution as we have seen how the processes of democratisation and decentralisation 
raise the question of citizenship among previously marginalised groups. 
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reform that effectively alters the design of social policy is more dependent on other factors. 
Rather, public officials on lower levels might have an interest in preserving their current 
position which might provide them a higher level of autonomy. With this said, state structure 
indeed seem to be an important determinant of the politics of welfare state reform. In this study 
the mechanisms of power concentration and dispersion have proved to be important for the 
possibility for progressive actors  to pursue comprehensive reform, as for incorporation of 
previously excluded groups into the political matrix. 
  Finally, what about the impact of policy legacies? Indeed as previous research has 
shown, state-corporatist  institutions prove to be effective in generating defensive coalitions 
making politics highly path dependent. However, the Bolivian case also illustrates how path 
departing change can be conceptualised as endogenous by focusing on, not only on the patterns 
of reproduction of a legacy, but also on how this legacy institutionalises patterns of exclusion 
and thus generates new bases for reformist coalitions when contextual factors change. As well, 
the gradual layering of institutional features might move the entire system towards a threshold 
were truly part departing change may indeed be not only possible but also probable given the 
interaction with other factors such as the level of social mobilisation and the existence of 
channels of influence for excluded segments of the population. 
 
6.1 Discussion 
Social security systems based on formal labour relations are under serious pressure in a context 
where the informal and agrarian sectors are being increasingly empowered by decentralisation 
and democratisation processes. While structural adjustment in Latin America did not manage to 
reduce poverty but rather enhanced inequality and labour market dualism, the simultaneous 
changes in state structures and the extension of civil and political rights have led to the 
emergence of movements demanding social rights such as healthcare and education. This 
pressure can indeed be conceptualised as the result of an enhancement of the efficacy of the 
power resources of previously marginalised groups. However, the introduction of 
comprehensive reform will depend on the ability of these groups to form progressive coalitions 
with labour unions in traditional industrial sectors and with the growing urban middle-classes. 
The support of these sectors is however contingent on the ability of reforms to guarantee 
continuity of the benefits granted by previous social security institutions  and improve the 
quality of services. A possible way forward may thus be the strategy of combing mandatory 
social insurance with universal social services. The funding of such an approach will however be 
dependent on the ability to develop modern and progressive taxation in order to break the   38 
current regressive distributional character of Latin American welfare states. The willingness to 
pay taxes is however in turn dependent on the characteristics of social policy pursued, making 
feedback effects a continuously important factor. Research from an institutionalist perspective 
will thus be of continued importance for our understanding of the processes of welfare state 
reform.   39 
References 
 
Albó, Xavier. 2008. “25 años de democracia, participación campesina - indígena y cambios 
reales en la sociedad”, Bolivia: 25 años construyendo la Democracia. Viceprecidencia de la 
República – Precidencia del Congreso Nacional, La Paz. 
Armanda, Francisco; Muntaner, Carles & Navarro, Vicente. 2001. “Health and Social Security 
Reform in Latin America: The Convergence of the World Health Organization, The World 
Bank, and Transnational Corporations,” International Journal of Health Services, vol. 31, nr. 4, 
pp. 729-768. 
Barrientos, Armando. 2004. “Latin America: a liberal-informal welfare regime?” in Gough, Ian; 
Wood, Geof, Barrientos, Armando; Bevan Philippa; Davis, Peter and Room, Graham eds., 
Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America - Social Policy in Development context, 
Cambrige University Press, Cambrige. 
Barrientos, Armando. 2010. Social Protection and Poverty, Social Policy and Development policy 
Paper No. 42, UNSRID, Geneva. 
Bocangel Peñaranda, Alfredo. 2004. Derecho de la Seguridad Social, Second Edition, Colegio de 
Abogados de La Paz, La Paz. 
de Barros, Ricardo Paes, de Carvalho, Mirela. 2004. Targeting and universalization as instruments for 
the reduction of inequalities, Inter-American Development Bank. 
Bergh, Andreas. 2004. “The Universal Welfare State: Theory and the Case of Sweden”, Political 
Studies, vol. 52, pp. 754-766. 
Bates, Robert H.; Greif, Avner; Levi, Margaret; Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent & Weingast, Barry, 
2000. “Review: “The Analytical Narrative Project”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 
94, No. 3, pp. 696-702. 
Bennett, Andrew & Elman, Colin. 2006. “Complex Causal Relations and Case Study Methods: 
The Example of Path Dependence”, Political Analysis, vol. 14, pp. 250-267. 
Bennett, Andrew& Elman, Colin. 2007. 
Bolivia. 2002.Ley del Seguro Universal Materno Infantil, Gaceta Oficial del Estado, La Paz. 
Bolivia, Estado Plurinacional de. 2008.Constitución Política de Estado, Estado Plurinacional de 
Bolivia, La Paz. 
Bolivia, Estado Plurinacional de. 2010.Decreto Supremo no 0772, Gaceta Oficial del Estado 
Plurinacional de Bolivia, La Paz. 
Bonoli, Giuliano. 2001, “Political Institutions, Veto Points, and the Process of Welfare State 
Adaption” in Pierson, Paul ed., The New Politics of the Welfare State, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford. 
Büthe, Tim. 2002. “Taking Temporality Seriously: Modelling History and the Use of Narratives 
as Evidence”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 96, No. 3. 
Cámara de Diputados. 2007. Proyecto de Ley No 005/2007, Bolivia, La Paz. 
Carnes, Mattew & Mares, Isabela. 2010. Deindustrialization and the Rise of Non-contributory Social 
Programs in Latin America, Paper presented at Duke University, Workshop on Social Policy 
in Developing Countries. 
Carnes, Mattew & Mares, Isabela. 2010. “Social Policy in Developing Coutries” Annual Review of 
Political Science, vol. 12. 
Clemens, Elisabeth S. & Cook, Kames M. 1999. “Politics and Institutionalism - Explaining 
Durability and Change”, Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 25, pp. 441-465. 
Colegio Médico Departamental de La Paz. 1999. Propuesta para la Reforma de Salud, Colegio 
Médico Departamental de La Paz, La Paz. 
Collier, Ruth Berins & Collier, David. 1991. Shaping the Political Arena – Critical Junctures, the Labor 
Movevent and Regime Dynamics in Latin America, Princeton University Press, Princeton.   40 
Collins, Charles, Green, Andrew & Hunter David. 1999. “Health Care Reform and the 
Interpretation of Policy Context”, Health Policy, vol. 47, pp. 69-83. 
Commision on Social Justice. 2006/1993. “What is Social Justice?” in Pierson, Christopher & 
Catels, Francis G. eds., The Welfare State Reader, 2
nd edition, Polity Press, Cambrige. 
Deacon, Bob. 2005. “From ‘Safety Nets’ back to ‘Universal Social Protection’: Is the Global 
Tide Turning?”, Global Social Policy, vol. 5(1), pp. 19-28. 
ECLAC/CEPALSTAT. 2011. Urban population employed in low productivity sectors of the labour market 
(informal sector), by sex, available at: 
http://websie.eclac.cl/sisgen/ConsultaIntegrada.asp?idAplicacion=1&idTema=5&idioma=
i, quoted 2011-09-14. 
El Cambio. Médicos realizan paro de 24 horas. 2011-03-24, available at: 
http://www.cambio.bo/noticia.php?fecha=2011-03-24&idn=41505, quoted 2011-09-10. 
El Cambio. La COB asegura que no participará en el Congreso Nacional de Salud, 2011-01-21, available 
at: http://www.cambio.bo/noticia.php?fecha=2011-01-21&idn=37067, quoted 2011-01-15. 
Esping-Andresen, Gösta. 1990. The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Cambrige University Press, 
Cambrige. 
Esquivel Velásquez, Adhemar D. 2005. Financiamiento de programas públicos de salud en Bolivia – 
Casos: Chagas Malaria, Tuberculosis e inmunización 1999-2005, UDAPE, La Paz. 
Falleti, Tulia G.& Lynch, Julia F. 2009 “Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis”. 
Comparative Political Studies, vol. 42; pp. 1143-1166. 
Farah H., Ivonne. 2006. “Pensarnos más iguales en un nuevo pacto redistributivo”, Umbrales, no. 
14, pp. 155-208. 
Filgueira, Fernando; Molina Carlos Gerardo; Papadópulos, Jorge &  Torbe, Federico. 2006. 
“Universalismo básico :Una alternativa posible y necesaria para mejorar las condiciones de 
vida”, in Molina, Carlos Gerardo (ed.): Universalismo Básico - Una nueva política social para 
América Latina, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington D.C. 
Galindo Soza, Mario. 2010. El progreso invisible - El Seguro Universal Materno Infantil, Fundación 
Milenio, La Paz. 
George, Alexander L. & Bennett, Andrew. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 
Gough, Ian. 2004. “Welfare regimes in development context:: a global and regional analysis” in 
Gough, Ian; Wood, Geof, Barrientos, Armando; Bevan Philippa; Davis, Peter and Room, 
Graham eds., Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America - Social Policy in 
Development context, Cambrige University Press, Cambrige. 
Graham, Carol. 1997. “Building Support for Market Reform in Bolivia: The Capitalization and 
Popular Participation Programs”, in Barda, Josef C. ed., The Deepening of Market Based Reform: 
Bolivia’s Capitalization Program, The Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, 
Washington D.C. 
Gran Álvarez, Miriam. 2008. Estructura de la BMC, Colaboración Médica Cubana, avlible at: 
http://colaboracion.sld.cu/paises/america-y-caribe/copy20_of_Paises/composicion-de-la-
brigada-medica-cubana/estructura-de-la-bmc/. 
Hacker, Jacob. 1989. “The Historical Logic of National Health Insurance: Structure and 
Sequence in the Development of British, Canadian and U.S. Medical Policy”, Studies in 
American Politica Development, vol. 12, pp. 57-130. 
Hall, Peter A. 2003. “Aligning ontology and methodology in comparative research”, in 
Mahoney, James and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social 
Sciences, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Hall, Peter A. 2010. “Historical Institutionalism in Rationalist and Sociological Perspective” in 
Mahoney, James & Thelen, Kathleen eds., Explaining Institutional Change – Ambiguity, Agency 
and Power, Cambrige University Press, New York.   41 
Homedes, Núria & Ugalde, Antonio. 2005. “Human resources: the Cinderella of health sector 
reform in Latin America”, Human Resources for Health, Vol. 3(1). 
Hurtado Gomez, Luis. 2000. “Sindicalismo Médico en Bolivia – Apuntes Sobre la 
Confederación Médica Sindical de Bolivia (COMSIB)”, Archivos Bolivianos de Historia de la 
Medicina, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 17-41. 
IDA. 2008. Financing Agreement - Expanding Access Reduce Inequities in Health Program (APL III), 
International Development Association, Washington D.C. 
Instituto Nacional de Estadística. 2011. Indicadores de pobreza extrema, según área, available at: 
http://www.ine.gob.bo/indice/EstadisticaSocial.aspx?codigo=30601, quoted 2011-09-15. 
Immergut, Ellen M. 1992. Health Politics: interests and institutions in Western Europe, University of 
Cambridge, Cambrige. 
INASES. 2009. Anuario Bioestadístico 2009, Instituto Nacional de Seguros de Salud, La Paz. 
Korpi, Walter. 1983. The Democratic Class Struggle, Routlege & Kegan, London. 
Korpi, Walter. 2006. “Power resources and employer-centered approaches in explanations of 
welfare states and varieties of capitalism – Protagonists, consenters and antagonists”, World 
Politics, Vol 58, pp. 167-206. 
Korpi, Walter & Palme, Joakim. 1998. “The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of 
Equality: Welfare State Institutions,Inequality, and Poverty in the Western Countries”, 
American Sociological Review, Vol. 63(5), pp. 661-687. 
Korpi, Walter & Palme, Joakim. 2003. “New Politics and Class Politics in the Context of 
Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18 Countries, 1975–95”, American Political 
Science Review, vol. 97(3), pp. 425-446. 
Kruse, Tom. 2010. “Los sindicatos frente a los procesos de transición política – Reflexiones 
desde Bolivia”, in de La Garza Toledo, Enrique, ed., Los sindicatos frente a los procesos de 
transición política, CLASCO, La Paz. 
La Razon. 2011-04-11. 
La Razon. 2011-04-12. 
Levkovitz, Eduardo. 2006. Desafíos de la protección social para la organización de los sistemas de salud en 
América Latina y el Caribe, paper presented at the Regional American Conferance of the ISSA 
in Belize City, ISSA.. 
Mahoney, James. 2000. “Path Dependence in Historical Sociology”, Theory and Society, Vol. 29(4), 
pp. 507-548. 
Mahoney, James. 2001. “Beyond Correlational Analysis: Recent Innovations in Theory and 
Method.” Sociological Forum 16(3): 575-593. 
Mahoney, James & Thelen, Kathleen. 2010. “A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change” in 
Mahoney, James & Thelen, Kathleen eds., Explaining Institutional Change – Ambiguity, Agency 
and Power, Cambrige University Press, New York. 
Mares, Isabela & Carnes, Matthew E. 2010. “Deindustrialization and the Rise of Non-
contributory Social Programs in Latin America,” paper presented at the Duke University, 
Workshop on Social Policy in Developing Countries. 
Marshall T.H. 2009[1950]. “Citizenship and Social Class”, in Manza, Jeff & Sauders, Michael, 
eds., Inequality and Society, W.W. Norton & Co., New York. 
MAS-IPSP.2005. Programa de Gobierno – Bolivia digna, soberana y productiva.. MAS-IPSP, La Paz. 
Ministerio de Poder Popular para el Salud & Ministerio de Poder Popular para la Planificación y 
Desarrollo. 2009. Plan Nacional de Salud 2009-2013, Venezuela, Caracas. 
Ministerio de Salud y Deportes. 2006. Plan sectorial de desarrollo 2006-2010, Ministerio de Salud y 
Deportes, La Paz. 
Ministerio de Salud y Deportes. 2007. Propuesta para la reforma estructural del sector salud en la 
Asamblea Constituyente, Ministerio de Salud y Deportes, La Paz. 
Ministerio de Salud y Deportes. 2010. Plan sectorial de desarrollo 2010-2020 – Hacia la Salud 
Universal, Ministerio de Salud y Deportes, La Paz.   42 
Ministerio de Salud y deportes. 2011a. Proyecto de Ley del Sistema Único de Salud, Ministerio de 
Salud y Deportes, La Paz. 
Ministerio de Salud y deportes. 2011b. “Congreso concluye con anteproyecto consensuado”, 
Salud para todos, no 242, Ministerio de Salud y Deportes, La Paz. 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 1978. Social Security in Latin America – Pressure Groups, Stratification and 
Inequality, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh. 
Mesa-Lago, Carmelo. 2007. Reassembling social security – A Survey of Pensions and Healthcare Reforms 
in Latin America, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Mkandawire, Thandika. 2005. Targeting and Universalism in Poverty Reduction, United Nations 
Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva. 
Navarro, Vicente. 1989. “Why some countries, have national health insurance, others have 
national health services and the U.S. has neither”, Social Science and Medicine, vol. 28(9), pp. 
887-898. 
Orloff, Ann Shola & Skocpol, Theda. 1984. “Why not equal protection? Explaining the politics 
of public social spending in Britain, 1900-1911 , and the United States, 1880s-1920”, 
American Sociology Review, vol. 49(6). pp. 726-5. 
Palier, Bruno. 2005. “Ambiguous Agreement, Cumulative Change: French Social Policy in the 
1990’s” in Mahoney, James & Thelen, Kathleen eds., Beyond Continuity- Institutional Change in 
Advanced Political Economies, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Pierson, Paul. 2000. “Increasing returns, path dependence, and the study of politics”. The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 94(2), pp 251-267. 
Pierson, Paul. 2004. Politics in Time – History, Institutions and Social Analysis, Princeton University 
Press, Princeton. 
Picado Chacón, Gustavo & Durán Valverde, Fabio. 2007. República de Bolivia: Diagnóstico del 
sistema de seguridad social, ILO, Lima. 
Prieto, A. Lorena & Cid, Camilo. 2010. Análisis del sector salud de Bolivia, Banco Interamericano de 
Desarrollo, Washington D.C. 
Rittich, Kerry. 2007. “Social Rights and Social Policy: Transformations on the International 
Landscape”, in Barak-Erez, Daphne and Gross, Aeyal M., eds., Exploring Social Rights: 
Between Theory and Practice. Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland. 
Rothstein, Bo. 2001. “The Universal Welfare State as a Social Dilemma”, Rationality and Society, 
vol. 13, pp. 213-233. 
Santa Cruz, Gobierno Autónomo de. 2010. Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, Pando y Cochabamba rechazan 
proyecto de ley gubernamental ‘Susalud’, available at: 
http://ftp.santacruz.gob.bo/prensa/notas/contenido.php?IdNoticia=1182&IdMenu=901, 
quoted 2011-09-15. 
Skocpol, Theda. 1985. “Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research”, 
in Evans, Peter B. et al eds., Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge University Press, Cambrige. 
Skocpol, Theda & Amenta, Edwin. 1986. “States and Social Policy”, Annual Review of Sociology, 
vol. 12, pp. 131-157. 
Stephens, John D. 1979. The Transition from Capitalism to Socialism. Macmillan, London. 
Tejerina Silva, Herland; De Paepe, Pierre; Soors, Werner; Lanza, Oscar V.; Closon, Marie-
Christine; Van Dessel, Patrick & Unger, Jean-Pierre. 2011. “Revisiting health policy and the 
World Bank in Bolivia”, Global Social Policy, vol. 11(1), pp. 22-44,  
Torres Tovar, Mauricio. 2007. “ALAMES: Organisational Expresion of Socail Medicine in 
Latin Amreica”, Social Medicine, vol. 2, nr. 3, pp. 123-130. 
UDAPE. 2008. “Gasto público no social, social y en la niñez y adolescencia según función, 
2000-2006 (en porcentaje respecto al Gasto Público Total)”, Compendio Estadístico: Inversión 
Social e Inversión Social en la Niñez y Adolescencia. UDAPE, La Paz. 
UDAPE/UNICEF. 2006. Evaluación de Impacto de los Seguros de Maternidad y Niñez 1989-2003, 
UDAPE & UNICEF, La Paz.   43 
Webber, Jeffrey R. 2011. From Rebellion to Reform in Bolivia: Class Struggle, Indigenous Liberation, and 
the Politics of Evo Morales, Haymarket Books, Chicago. 
Weisbrot, Mark; Ray, Rebecca & Johnston, Jake. 2009. Bolivia: The Economy During the Morales 
Administration, Centre for Economic and Policy Research, Washington D.C. 
Weyland, Kurt. 2006. Bounded Rationality And Policy Diffusion – Social Sector Reform in America 
Latina, Princeton University Press, Princeton. 
WHO. 1978. Declaration of Alma Ata, International Conference on Primary Health Care, Alma 
Ata. 
WHO. 2011. “Bolivia Plurinational States of  - National Expenditure on Health (Boliviano)”, 
Global Health Expenditure Database, available at: 
http://apps.who.int/nha/database/ChoiceDataExplorerRegime.aspx, quoted 2011-08-19. 
World Bank. 1997. Health, Nutrition, and Population Sector Strategy Paper, World Bank, Washington, 
D.C. 
World Bank. 2005. Program Document: Boliva SSPC II, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
World Bank. 2009. Estrategia de Asistencia del Banco Mundial al Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, World 
Bank, Washington, D.C. 
 
Interviews 
1. Aguilar Álvarez, Reynaldo. 2011. Head of the Public Insurance Unit, Ministry of Health and 
Sports. 
2. Crespo Infantes, Germán Alejandro. 2011. Planning Director, Ministry of Health and Sports. 
3. Cuentas, Guillermo. 2011. Former Minister of Health (1997-2002). 
4. Executive Committee. 2011. Confederación Nacional de Mujeres Campesinas Indígenas 
Originarios de Bolivia – Bartolina Sisa, (National Confederation of Indigenous Peasant 
Women – Bartolina Sisa). 
5. Esquivel Velasquez, Adhemar. 2011. Unit for Analysis of Social and Economic Policy 
(UDAPE). 
6. Flores, Margarita. 2011. Head of Public Insurances, Ministry of Health and Sports. 
7. Garcia, Benedicta. 2011. Deputy (MAS-IPSP), Social Security and Social Protection 
Committee, Plurinational Legislative Assembly. 
8. Izquierdo, Emigdio. 2011. Secretary of Conflicts, Bolivian Workers’ Confederation (COB). 
9. Jemio Ortuño, Jorge. 2011. General Director of Health Promotion, Ministry of Health and 
Sports. 
10. Laruta, Carlos Hugo. 2011. Party representative, Unidad Nacional. 
11. Maturano Trigo, Martín. 2011. Vice-minister of Health, Ministry of Health and Sports. 
12. Oporto Barrozo, Gilda Alcira. 2011. Deputy (MAS-IPSP), Health, Sports and Recreation 
Committee, Plurinational Legislative Assembly. 
13. Paz Nina, Isidro. 2011. Party representative, Movimiento Sin Miedo. 
14. Peñaranda España, Carlos M. 2011. General administrator. Chamber of the Pharmaceutical 
Industry/Bolivian Confederation of Private Enterprises. 
15. Pereira Loayza, Nancy Elisabeth. 2011. Executive secretary, Medical Union of La Paz. 
16. Quenta, Daniela. 2011. Executive, National Federation of Domestic Workers.   44 
Methodological appendix 
When deciding who to interview the starting points have been the theories which are to be 
tested.  The interviewees have mainly been located by  the author through their position in 
organisations and institutions which are of importance to the case. Thus representatives of civil 
society, especially those representing different sectors of the labour force, have been chosen 
along with a representative of the employers’ organisations and political parties, in line with the 
power resource approach. Public officials from the Ministry of Health have also been selected 
bearing in mind both their access to inside information about the policy process and their 
potential role as autonomous actors in this process  as a state-centred approach indicates. 
Interviews have also been carried out with informants who are chosen on the basis of their 
general knowledge about the case at hand and whose perspectives are thought to contribute to 
the understanding of the process of reform (interviews 3 and 5). These latter interviewees have 
unlike the others  been approached after recommendations of initial contacts. The main 
shortcoming of the final sample is the absence of representatives of international organisations 
and financial institutions, which could have strengthened the assessment of the processes of 
policy diffusion. The role of these is instead assed in the other interviews and through the 
review of written sources. 
 
Below is the interview guides used when conducting the field research in Bolivia. Due to the 
semi structured approach the time each interview took varied, from half an hour up to almost 
two hours, with most of them lasting for a little less than an hour. A first set of questions were 
used when interviewing government officials and other persons with well-informed perspectives 
on the Bolivian healthcare system and the process of reform. These interviews are thus more of 
a informant character and includes questions on the design of the reforms. Thereafter follows a 
set of questions used when interviewing actors with claims towards the healthcare system and 
are thus more of a respondent character. However, the division of the interviewees in categories 
of respondents and informants is not clear cut. Clearly, many of those who are best situated to 
give informed statements on factual matters also have an interest in the process of reform. The 
questions  used when interviewing those perceived primarily as actors  are intended both to 
reveal the actors’ views on the healthcare system and the process of reform as well as their 
interaction with this process.  There are accordingly  several questions included in the actor 
interviews which are meant to corroborate information provided from other sources, identify 
how the respondents have understood the process under study and reveal any potential biases 
of different sources, together with questions meant to reveal the interests and actions of the 
actor represented by the respondent. 
 
Interviews with informants and government officials 
 
1.  Could you please introduce yourself and tell me about your organisation/institution and 
how you got to hold your current position? 
 
2.  What do you perceive as the primary shortcomings of the Bolivian healthcare system? 
 
3.  How will the system of healthcare services be reformed with the new Unified 
Healthcare System? 
 
4.  How will the new Unified Healthcare System be financed? 
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5.  Could you describe the process which has led up to the current proposal for a Unified 
Healthcare System? 
 
6.  Who do you perceive as the main beneficiaries and losers with the policies the Ministry 
of Health and Sports proposes? 
 
7.  What is the origin of the plan to introduce a Unified Healthcare System with universal 
accesses suggested by the ministry? 
 
8.  Why are the proposals for a universal healthcare system launched right now? 
 
9.  Which actors have been influential in this process and at which have been the channels 
these actors have used to exert this influence? 
 
10. At what stage of the political process have these actors been most influential? 
 
11. Why has the introduction of the new policies been delayed? 
 
12. Who have been the primary actors and political forces who have promoted the Unified 
Healthcare system with universal access which are now being launched by the Ministry 
of Health and Sports? 
 
13. Has there been any dialog on international level about the design of the Unified 
Healthcare System, with other governments or with international institutions? When 
and with who? 
 
14. Has there been a dialog on national or local level with the civil society, social 
movements or representatives of the institutions which would be affected by the reform? 
When and with who? 
 
15. What has been the role of local and regional governments? 
 
16. How has the policies in the healthcare sector developed, including the system of public 
insurance schemes and who have been the primary actors promoting these policies? 
 
Interviews with non-state actors 
 
1.  Can you describe your organisation, its’ objectives and activities? 
 
2.  What do you perceive as the primary shortcomings of the Bolivian healthcare system? 
 
3.  Which do you perceive as the reasons for the low coverage in healthcare in Bolivia? 
 
4.  Which are your proposals to change or improve the healthcare system? 
 
5.  How are you working in order to change the current situation in the health sector and 
achieve your objectives? 
 
6.  Are you familiar with the government’s proposal to introduce a unified healthcare 
system with universal access? 
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7.  What do you think of this proposal, how would you evaluate it? 
 
8.  What do you perceive to be the origin of these proposals to introduce a Unified 
Healthcare System with universal accesses suggested by the ministry? 
 
9.  Who are the actors promoting this reform? 
 
10. Who are opposing it? 
 
11. Why are the proposals for a universal healthcare system launched right now? 
 
12. What is the role of the local and regional governments in the healthcare reform? 
 
13. Have you or our organisation participated in any dialog with the government about the 
Unified Healthcare System? 
 